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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
In the instant case, the tax court could have sustained the petitioner's
claim for travel and living expenses on at least two bases: (1) the court
could have defined the term "home" to mean domicile and held that the
exigencies of business prompted the petitioner's trip, or (2) it could
have determined that the employment accepted away from the peti-
tioner's home was of a temporary nature, and, therefore, should have
fallen under the Peurifoy exception to the Flowers rule.
There is, as previously stated, a conflict among the circuits relating to
the correct interpretation of "home" as used in section 162 (a) (2) of the
Internal Revenue Code. Thus, the tax court in Suzanne W'aggener was
merely following its circuit's interpretation of that statutory term. Under
the Flowers decision, however, even if the tax court had defined home as
meaning domicile, the petitioner's claims would still not have been al-
lowed as the court found that these expenses were neither necessitated by
her employer's business, nor through the exigencies of her own business
as a clerk-typist.
The application of Peurifoy to cases falling under section 162 (a) (2)
of the Internal Revenue Code is unclear and probably will not be settled
until the Supreme Court further interprets this doctrine.
However, once the tax court had determined that the petitioner had
no set tax home from which to move, the Peurifoy exception to the Flow-
ers case was no longer applicable in Suzanne Waggener. Thus, if the
petitioner had no home to move from, the fact that she accepted employ-
ment of a temporary nature, as opposed to employment of an indefinite
nature, was immaterial.2"
LEONARD R. STEINSAPIR
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW - CLEVELAND PUBLIC
DEFENDER - AUTHORIZED
Azzarello v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 185 N.E.2d 566 (Ohio App. 1962)
In two recent cases,' the Legal Aid Society of Cleveland was alleged
to be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in the operation of its
newly-organized Legal Aid Defender office. Under a plan put into effect
on March 1, 1960, the Society makes available its charitable funds to sup-
port the Defender's office. By contract with the Legal Aid Society, the
Defender exclusively represents indigent persons in the courts of Cuya-
hoga County when called upon to do so by lawful authority or by an
20. In Suzanne Waggener, the court stated that the petitioner's claim had "an air of un-
reality." It also said: "since the entire record of the case is not before us in the reported
opinion, it is impossible to determine the soundness of the court's observation." Ibid. Per-
haps this is the underlying reason for the court denying the petitioner's claim.
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indigent party. Salaried by the Society, the Defender may accept no
compensation from indigent clients. The statutory fee payable to as-
signed counsel in the court of common pleas is, according to the con-
tract, endorsed over to the Society and placed in a fund for support of
the Defender's office.
The question presented in both cases was whether the contractural
relationship thus established, together with the Society's referral function,
constituted the unlawful practice of law.
For performing this service, the Legal Aid Society received no bene-
fit and did not serve as an intermediary between the Defender and his
client. The court found that the Defender serves as the personal counsel
of the accused and is not an appendage of the Society. Citing a Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court opinion on unauthorized practice legislation,2
the court held that the Society was not engaged in unauthorized practice,
either in the operation of the Defender's office or in referral of indigents
involved in civil and criminal cases to its salaried attorneys.
The opinion is based principally upon considerations of public policy.
The court noted that providing counsel to indigents is a necessary public
service,' and that under the Cleveland system, which embodies several
departures from the usual public defender plan, the Defender must
await appointment by the court or the request of a party. He receives
public funds only indirectly through the statutory fee system.'
The Legal Aid concept was adopted in the United States in 1876
with the opening of facilities dedicated to the provision of gratuitous
legal aid to German immigrants in New York City.5 Following its in-
ception, the idea spread rapidly. A "Bureau of Justice," which under-
took to give legal assistance to all, "regardless of nationality, race, or
sex," was opened in Chicago shortly thereafter.6 The concept of a public
defender, though established in Europe in the early nineteenth century,7
1. Azzarello v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 185 N.E.2d 566 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962), consolidated with
Benjamin v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 185 N.E.2d 566 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
2. In re Opinion of The Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1935). In answer to
questions submitted by the Massachusetts Senate concerning unauthorized practice legislation,
this court excluded from "practice of law" the furnishing of gratuitous legal aid to the poor
in the pursuit of any dvil remedy, as a matter of charity. Yet, the court points out in a subse-
quent statement that such activities lie dose to the borderline and may easily become or be
accompanied by "practice of law."
3. Azzarello v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 185 N.E.2d 566, 570 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
4. This method of finandng the Defender office is roundly criticized. See Franey, The Legal
Aid Defender Plan: Theory vs. Practicability, 31 CLEVE. B.A.J. 145 (1960). Cf. State
ex. rel. McCurdy v. Carney, 170 Ohio St. 175, 174 N.E.2d 253 (1961).
5. BROWNELL, LEGAL AiD IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (1951).
6. Ibid.
7. U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTncS, DEP'T. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 607, at 32 (1936).
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did not crystallize in the United States until 1913, when the first office'
was created by charter provision in Los Angeles County, California.9
Since 1913, a network of Legal Aid and Defender offices has de-
veloped throughout the country. Figures from the 1960 Census show
132 offices with salaried attorneys rendering aid in civil cases' ° and
ninety-six defenders offering services to indigents in the criminal area."
As the necessity for some method of administering legal services to
indigents became increasingly apparent, a variety of systems were de-
veloped to cope with the problem. The predominant forms were in
operation in several areas by 1916.12 Generally, six different forms
existed: (1) charitable societies and voluntary associations; (2) depart-
ments of privately supported social welfare agencies; (3) tax supported
public bureaus; (4) facilities offered and controlled by local bar associa-
tions; (5) legal aid clinics affiliated with law schools; and (6) the vol-
untary and public defender organizations.'"
The necessity for providing beneficial, yet practical service to meet
the needs of the indigent in this important area led to extensive research
and studies to evaluate the variety of plans presented. 4 Most of these
studies have indicated that the public defender plan is superior in nearly
all respects to other methods of extending aid to the indigent. 5
The public defender system has both advantages and disadvantages
which are usually widely espoused by legal scholars and practitioners
when a defender plan is proposed. 6 These arguments were undoubtedly
considered by the court in the instant cases in reaching the decision that
public policy favors the public defender concept.
Generally, the defender system has the advantage of offering a higher
8. There is some dispute among authorities as to what constituted the first true public de-
fender in the United States. An Oklahoma Public Defender office was opened in 1911, but
its services were limited to representation of minors, delinquents, orphans, and mental defec-
tives. See SMITH, JUSTIcE AND THE POOR 117 (1919). Most historical works treat the
Los Angeles County Defender office as the initiator of the system in this country. Com-
mencing operations on January 9, 1914, it has offered continuous service since that date.
9. BROWNELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 126.
10. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 12, 14 (supp. 1961).
11. Id. at 14.
12. BROWNELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 8.
13. Id. at 9-11.
14. See Special Committee of the Assn. of the Bar of the City of New York and the National
Legal Aid and Defender Assn. Rept., EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED (1959). This study
applied six distinct standards to each of the major systems for furnishing legal aid to the in-
digent. These criteria demanded that (1) the system provide counsel to every indigent person;
(2) experienced and competent representation; (3) investigatory facilities; (4) counsel at
a sufficiently early stage to insure proper protection; (5) undivided loyalty to the client; and
(6) for support by community participation and responsibility.
15. Ibid. The Public Defender plan complies with the standards enunciated in the New
York report in all respects. See generally Cuff, Public Defender System, 45 MrINN. L. REV.
715, 734 (1961).
16. See Fiske, In Defense of our Legal Aid Defender Plan, 31 CLEvE. B.A.J. 144 (1960);
Franey, supra note 4.
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quality of legal assistance to indigents because of its superior facilities for
investigation and the Defender's greater opportunity for specialization.
The Defender is present and available at all times, and the system has
proven more efficient and economical, particularly in large urban areas."7
On the other hand, it is often urged that the large volume of cases neces-
sarily flowing through the Defender's office may cause him to become
either hardened and indifferent to the merits of individual situations or,
conversely, sentimental toward criminals.'" Also, opponents assert that
the Defender would not be as enthusiastic as other appointed counsel and
would in fact evolve into another bureaucratic political officer. 9
Given the proposition that no existing plan perfectly fulfills the needs
of all indigents, the facts seem to indicate that this system can be fairly
evaluated only within the context of the problem which it was designed
to meet - the provision of legal counsel to any individual who is un-
able to retain an attorney.
Since clarification by the United States Supreme Court of the guar-
antees embodied in the sixth and fourteenth amendments," the problem
of practicability in supplying representation to indigent parties has re-
ceived greater attention in legal circles. Legal aid and public de-
fender facilities are offered as one solution to this problem. In decid-
ing the instant cases, the court of appeals carefully weighed the extent
to which the plan existing in Cleveland fulfills this constitutional need.
The decision reached by the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals should
clear the shadow of illegality from similarly orientated defender systems,
and thus offer another plausible answer to the practical problems en-
gendered by the mandates of the sixth and fourteenth amendments.
DALE T. EvANs
17. BROWNELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 144.
18. See Cleveland Bar Opposes Public Defender Plan, 17 A.B.AJ. 141 (1931).
19. Ibid.
20. The United States Supreme Court first approached this problem of the extent to which
the Constitutional guarantees of right to counsel were to encompass indigents unable to retain
a paid attorney in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The Court held that where
special circumstances existed, counsel must be assigned in capital cases. In 1938, the Court
asserted that the sixth amendment constitutionally entitles every indigent criminal defendant
in the federal court system to the assignment of counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938). This concept has recently been assimilated into the proposed amendments to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to
FED. R. CiUm. P. (Dec. 1962). The rule of the Johnson case, however, was not applicable
to the states. Thereafter, Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), established a precedent which
was to control assignment of counsel by state courts for twenty-one years. In the Betts case,
the Court held that mere failure of state courts to assign counsel to indigent defendants in non-
capital cases did not alone constitute denial of a fundamental right as guaranteed by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In the spring of 1963, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the Betts decision, holding that the right to the assistance of counsel was a
fundamental right available to all indigent criminals accused in state courts. See Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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